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Abstract
Controlling cognitive systems like domestic robots or intelligent as-
sistive environments requires striking an appropriate balance between
responsiveness and persistence. Basic goal arbitration is an essential
element of low-level action selection for cognitive systems, necessar-
ily preceding even deliberate control in the direction of attention. In
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natural intelligence, chemically-regulated motivation systems focus an
agent’s behavioural attention on one problem at a time. Such simple
durative decision state can improve the efficiency of artificial action se-
lection by avoiding dithering, but taken to extremes such systems can
be inefficient and produce cognitively-implausible results. This arti-
cle describes and demonstrates an easy-to-implement, general-purpose
latching method that allows for a balance between persistence and flex-
ibility in the presence of interruptions. This appraisal-based system
facilitates automatic reassessment of the current focus of attention by
existing action-selection mechanisms. We propose a mechanism, flexi-
ble latching, and demonstrate that it drastically improves efficiency in
handling multiple competing goals at the cost of a surprisingly small
amount of extra code (or cognitive) complexity. We briefly discuss im-
plications of these results to understanding natural cognitive systems.
Keywords: Action selection; drives; modularity; cognitive architec-
tures
1 Introduction1
The term action selection might seem to imply cognition, but this is merely2
due to anthropomorphic labelling. If we take cognition to be a process re-3
quiring time (probably a form of on-line search; [42]), and action selection4
to be any mechanism for determining the present course of action [11], then5
2
much of action selection is really non-cognitive. Action choices in animals6
are limited both by evolution and individual skill learning; for adult animals7
many actions may be essentially reflexive [5, 7]. Such limiting is necessary if8
action selection is to be achieved in a timely manner [37, 15, 21]. However,9
there is no question that animals (including humans) do engage in cognition10
in some contexts. This article examines one such context: the arbitration11
between different goals. Even here, basic arbitration must necessarily be12
automatic. However, functional and efficient behaviour requires that the13
automated system can in some situations be interrupted and controlled cog-14
nitively [39]. Here we present a way to efficiently facilitate this capacity in15
artificial cognitive systems.16
Budgeting time and pursuing multiple conflicting goals is a key aspect17
of any cognitive system [17, 22]. In the simulation of real-time animal-like18
intelligence considered in this paper, artificial agents must carry out a set19
of tasks, essential to their survival, while also interacting with dynamic sur-20
roundings, including other agents. Other-agent interactions in particular21
may include activities that are potentially essential to the species as a whole22
but not necessarily in the interest of the performing individual’s viability.23
This characterisation might suggest rather dramatic activities, e.g. fending24
off attack, but it can also apply to ordinary duties. In some sense, the tasks25
that the system was originally designed to carry out (e.g. mating in nature,26
or perhaps tea making for an office robot) are of lower immediate priority27
than making certain that the system maintains working order, since working28
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order (e.g. the ability to move and manipulate) is a precondition of any29
other activity. Nevertheless, it is clear that we require an agent to devote30
considerable time to the goals that motivated its construction. Such critical31
but non-urgent goals are common amongst animals, such as maintaining a32
social network, reproducing or keeping clean. All these behaviours require33
both time and energy, and it follows that agents possessing more efficient be-34
haviour management should, in general, fare better than other agents with35
less efficient behaviour selection.36
In this article, we demonstrate our goal-arbitration system using a simple37
artificial life task environment. Our agents must ensure they have the ability38
to store excess energy in order to pursue auxiliary behaviours. We discov-39
ered the need for an improved arbitration mechanism during the course of40
research on the evolution of primate social structures, so our examples de-41
rive from these models. The immediately urgent goals concern feeding, while42
the ultimately-important goals are social networking and exploration. Note43
that in nature such goals could also be considered survival-oriented, since44
socialising promotes long-term survival by facilitating group living [17, 25].45
However, their payoff is more diffuse — it is seldom knowable when addi-46
tional goodwill or information gathered may become critical, in contrast to47
starvation which has clear endogenous indicators. Thus we place essential48
behaviours at a high priority, but design an action-selection mechanism to49
ensure they are executed as efficiently as possible.50
In this article we present a comparative study of three variants of a simple51
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action-selection mechanism designed to improve the agent’s capacity for goal52
arbitration. Our primary motivation is a potential inefficiency that may53
occur when an agent attempts to acquire a buffer of excess satisfaction before54
pursuing its next goal. We propose that if an agent is interrupted at any stage55
during this period, a choice needs to be made concerning whether to continue56
with the current goal or whether to attend to other, possibly more relevant57
behaviours. Persistence avoids the inefficiency of dithering between multiple58
goals. Dithering is inefficient because there is typically a significant start-59
up cost to pursuing new goals before consummatory actions can take place.60
However, some degree of flexibility avoids the inefficiency of pursuing a goal61
which is no longer urgent and has locally become excessively costly.62
We look to biological motivation systems for inspiration because these63
have presumably evolved to manage this trade off. However, here we do not64
attempt a perfect or neurological model nature. Rather, our emphasis in this65
article is engineering. We present and evaluate a simple control mechanism66
that achieves the requisite level of flexibility at minimal cost. In fact, two67
types of costs are kept minimal: both the advance, coding-time costs for68
the agent’s designers and the real-time, cognitive-processing costs for the69
agents. We use a basic latching system augmented with the ability to detect70
potentially relevant interruptions. This threshold-based addition triggers a71
reevaluation of priorities already present in the agents’ overall action-selection72
system.73
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2 Methods74
In this section we first describe the particular agent architectures we use75
to test our new goal arbitration system. Although we use a single system76
here, it is an example of a common type of action-selection system, and we77
describe the augmentation in general terms so that it may be applied on78
other systems as well. We then describe the specific goals to be manipu-79
lated in the experiments, and define the metrics of success in terms of these.80
Next, we describe the various latching mechanisms we have implemented for81
comparison. Finally, we describe the testing scenarios, including the agents’82
operating environment, followed by the presentation and discussion of our83
results.84
2.1 Basic Action Selection85
The agents are specified using the behaviour-oriented design (BOD) method-86
ology [12], a system that produces complete, complex agents consisting of (a)87
modules that specify details of their behaviour and (b) dynamic plans that88
specify agent-wide, cross-modular priorities. Actions are produced by the89
modules; action selection (where there is contention) is carried out using90
the Parallel-rooted, Ordered Slip-stack Hierarchical (POSH) dynamic plan91
system [10].92
We chose BOD as a fairly simple example of an architectural consensus93
achieved in the late 1990s for real-time, situated systems: That AI is best94
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constructed using a combination of modularity, for providing intelligent prim-95
itives, and structured hierarchical plans, for encoding priorities [24, 26, 8].96
Even mainstream cognitive architectures such as Soar and ACT-R can be97
described in this way [28, 38]. Such approaches have been somewhat ne-98
glected in the academic literature in the last decade due to an emphasis on99
machine learning approaches to action selection. However, in applied human-100
like AI such as games programming and cognitive robotics, such modular,101
hand-coded approaches are still very much the norm [23, 31].102
The details of the structured action-selection system are unimportant to103
the mechanism presented in this paper. All that is assumed is104
• some mechanism for storing temporary values of long-term state105
(e.g. learning),106
• some mechanism of expressing a variety of goals and their associated107
actions, and108
• the notion of a trigger or precondition as part of the mechanism for109
choosing between goals and actions.110
A single POSH plan was used to specify the priorities of all the agents111
tested here. That is, all the agents have the same priorities and therefore112
the same dynamic plan, though of course their expressed behaviour will vary113
due to their environment and their previous experience. What differs between114
conditions in the experiments described below are only the action-selection115
mechanisms and the testing environments.116
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The plan, shown in Figure 1, assumes four basic behaviours (drives): B1117
to B4. In POSH, the top level of a plan hierarchy (the drive collection) is118
checked on every cycle of the controller. Control is passed to the highest-119
priority drive element whose trigger (line-labels in Figure 1) is true. All120
but behaviour B4 further contain a sub-plan, in POSH called a competence.121
Competences also contain elements each with their own trigger, but these122
are plans for the purpose of pursuing a single goal, and as such require less123
sophisticated scheduling than the drive collection. Competences maintain124
decision memory and control behaviour until they either terminate, pass125
control to a child competence of their own, or the main drive collection takes126
control back for a higher-priority problem. Their execution is similar to teleo-127
reactive plans [32] or indeed to the generalised plans created by STRIPS [18].128
The first two behaviours, which are of the highest (and equal) priority,129
fulfil consumption-related needs, such as eating or drinking, the neglect of130
which would cause the agent to die. Behaviours B3 and B4 are of lower131
priority and are only considered for potential execution if B1 and B2 are132
not triggered. It should be noted that these behaviours are of lower priority133
simply because behaviours B1 and B2 are essential to the agent’s immediate134
survival. This does not imply, however, that lower-priority behaviours are135
not important, they could be critical to the agent’s mission. Since our experi-136
mental environment represents primate social behaviour, these behaviours in137
fact relate to increasing the probability of longer life. As such, behaviour B3138
represents social networking through grooming, which requires two agents to139
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explore
Drive Collection: Agent
B3: groom
B1: drinkwants to drink
locate drink
move to drink
drink
has no drink
has located drink
is at drink
B2: eat
locate food
move to food
eat
B4: explore
locate mate
move to mate
groom
wants to groom
default behaviour
wants to eat
has no food
has located food
is at food
has no mate
has located mate
is at mate
p
ri
o
ri
ty
always true
secondary actions
primary actions
drive
competence
Figure 1: The POSH plan that determines priorities for the agents: the
drive collection (SDC) is called at every time step and its elements checked
in order: {B1=eat, B2=drink}, {B3=groom}, {B4=explore}. The highest-
priority element whose trigger is true is executed. Equal priority elements
(i.e., B1 and B2) are checked in random order.
interact with one another. The final behaviour (B4) is exploration, possibly140
to find new food sources. In a POSH plan, the lowest-priority goal serves as141
a default behaviour and should always be triggerable. Thus if an agent with142
this plan is efficiently arbitrating between goals, it should be able to spend143
most of its time exploring new space.144
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2.2 Metrics of Efficient Behaviour145
The primary focus of our investigations then is on behaviours B3 and B4.146
Lower priority behaviours may only be executed if all higher priority be-147
haviours are managed efficiently and for artificial agents, the ‘lower’ be-148
haviours are typically the ones that define and justify the agent’s mission.149
Despite their significance these behaviours are necessarily of lower priority150
than those that facilitate the survival of the agent so it can perform these151
tasks. It is therefore paramount that these higher-level behaviours are man-152
aged efficiently enough to allow agents to pursue other behaviours as well.153
Each behaviour is composed of numerous elements, some of which may be154
classified as secondary actions. In the case of feeding, the secondary actions155
would be ‘locating food source’ and ‘move towards food source’. The primary156
action would correspond to ‘eat’. For all behaviours, executing the primary157
action with a high frequency relative to the secondary actions determines158
the degree of efficiency with which the behaviour is executed. Dithering, the159
rapid switching between goals, results in secondary actions being performed160
excessively in proportion ton primary ones. In our example, each behaviour161
Bi has one such primary action which will be denoted as B
α
i . The frequency162
at which primary actions are executed determines the degree to which all163
behaviours may be executed and thus defines the metric of success at the164
centre of our investigation.165
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2.3 Agents and State166
Each behaviour Bi is associated a single-valued internal state Ei. Here, for167
the sake of clarity and without loss of generality, we use the concept of energy168
to denote the internal state of the agent: each behaviour Bi has a current169
level of energy Ei. The agents live in a toroidal, discrete-time world with170
dimensions of 600 × 600 pixels. Time is considered to be discrete and at171
every time step, all agents in the environment are updated simultaneously.172
In particular, at every time-step, all energy states Ei are decreased by e
−
i .173
If a given behaviour is vital to the agent’s survival, death is imminent once174
Ei ≤ 0. For each behaviour, we define a threshold δi such that Bi is trig-175
gered once Ei < δi. Once Bi is triggered, the agent will execute the actions176
associated with that particular behaviour. The behaviours B1 and B2 in our177
example correspond to sustenance activities (eating or drinking): The agent178
first locates an energy source, moves towards the energy source (at a speed179
of 2 pixels/time step) and consumes the source once in close proximity. This180
consumption raises the agent’s internal state by e+i . Clearly we must ensure181
that e+i  e
−
i , ∀i as otherwise an agent would never be able to satisfy a182
need (and in the case of essential behaviours, the agent would eventually183
die). Here we have chosen the same values for all behaviours: e+ = 1.1184
and e− = 0.1 and hence drop the behaviour-dependent subscript i from here185
on. Since we are interested in the execution of lower-priority behaviours, an186
individual choice of energy gain/loss across the different behaviours would187
require the adjustment of the individual thresholds (which are tightly related188
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to the net energy gain), unnecessarily complicating the model. Overall, this189
gives a net energy gain of e± = 1 for any primary action.190
Lower-priority behaviours (i.e. B3 and B4) may only be executed if B1191
and B2 are satisfied. What it means for a behaviour to be ‘satisfied’ depends192
upon the implementation of the agents’ action selection — the basis of this193
article which we describe next.194
2.4 Conditions195
We use three different action selection mechanisms and evaluate their impact196
on the efficiency of the agent: unlatched, strict latch and flexible latch.197
2.4.1 Unlatched198
As mentioned in the previous section, a behaviour Bi is triggered if Ei < δi.199
In the basic unlatched model, the drive terminates as soon as Ei ≥ δi and the200
time spent at the energy source is expected to be relatively short (although201
this depends strictly on δi−Ei which may vary depending on the number of202
equal-priority behaviours). Furthermore, no excess energy is stored and the203
behaviour is triggered again very shortly after it is satisfied1. When there204
are multiple such behaviours, the agent will continue to oscillate between205
them (dithering). Even if there is only a single top-priority behaviour, the206
agent will spend its entire time in close proximity to the energy source as the207
1The theoretical maximum possible excess energy in this case given the values of e+
and e− is 0.9 which will last for 9 time steps.
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acquired energy is always insufficient to pursue anything else.208
2.4.2 Strict latch209
In the latched models, the agent only terminates the drive once Ei ≥ φi210
where φi ≥ δi. Now the agent has an energy reserve of (φi − δi)/e
− time211
steps before the behaviour is triggered again. If all high-priority drives are212
latched in this way and the latch is sufficiently large (see next section), the213
agent is able to eventually follow lower-priority drives. This form of latching214
is very inefficient, however, if the agent inhabits a world where unexpected215
interruptions may occur. If an agent is almost finished with one activity but216
gets interrupted, the agent will continue to pursue this activity independent217
of other, lower-or-same priority needs. For example, an agent that is groom-218
ing and whose partner has left, might pursue another partner for five minutes219
when only another five seconds of grooming would have satiated it. This is220
true even if Ei = φi −  where  φi − δi and hence this form of latching is221
referred to as strict.222
2.4.3 Flexible latch223
If the agent is able to detect interruptions, the interruption could trigger224
a decision that determines it subsequent activities. Such a decision might225
be conscious, but here we simply relax the latching by using yet another226
threshold, ψi, that is situated in-between the previously two established ones,227
δi ≤ ψi ≤ φi. This gives rise to two different scenarios. If the interruption228
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occurs when:229
1. δi < Ei < ψi, the drive remains ‘unsatisfied’230
2. ψi < Ei < φi, then the drive is considered ‘satisfied’231
Note that for δi < Ei < φi the status of any latch is path or history dependent232
— if Ei was more recently below δ the drive is now unsatisfied, if it was more233
recently satiated (about φ) than it is not. What is new for the flexible latch is234
that if an interruption occurs in the third scenario, where Ei had been below235
δ but has now been raised above ψi, this path dependency is dismissed.236
2.5 Threshold Selection237
The previous section has discussed different thresholds that require initialisa-238
tion and the choice of parameters is crucial to the outcome of the simulation.239
First, it should be noted that the flexible latch is simply a generalisation of240
the strict latch, which in turn is a generalisation of the unlatched technique:241
Flexible latch δ ≤ ψ ≤ φ
Strict latch δ ≤ ψ = φ
Unlatched δ = ψ = φ
In this investigation, we have two primary points of interest, which are closely242
related: Survival and efficiency. The survival of the agent crucially depends243
on the choice of δ. Efficiency, on the other hand, refers to the agent’s ability244
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to pursue all its behaviours, not just high-priority ones, and depends on the245
choice of φ and ψ. In order for an agent to survive, any vital behaviour must246
be triggered such that the agent has enough energy to approach the energy247
source (locating an energy source can be done in a single time-step and is248
subsequently excluded from the following discussion):249
δi ≥ E
r
i (1)
where Eri is the energy required to reach the source: (dmax/dmov)×e
−, where250
dmov is the distance an agent can move in a single time step and dmax is the251
maximum possible distance an agent can travel2. If there are n equally vital252
behaviours, δi has to be adjusted accordingly:253
δi ≥
n−1∑
j=1
(
E
r
j + E
c
j
)
+ Erj (2)
where Eci is the energy required to raise the energy level to the appropriate254
level:255
E
c
i =
δi −Ei
e±
(3)
2The theoretical maximum in this case is simply
√
(width/2)2 + (height/2)2 ≈ 424
and it would take the agent a maximum of 424/2=212 time steps to reach the target,
consuming 212× 0.1 = 21.2 units of energy.
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The value of φ, on the other hand, has to be set such that enough energy is256
stored to pursue all vital needs:257
φi ≥ δi +
n∑
j=1
(
E
r
j + E
c
j
)
(4)
Any excess energy is subsequently devoted to the other, lower-priority be-258
haviours. This choice of φi necessarily affects Ec as now more time is spent at259
the energy source (a difference of φi − δi). Interruptions drastically alter Ec260
and the energy required to satisfy a latched behaviour given m interruptions261
is simply:262
E
c
i =
m∑
j=1
(
E
r
ij + E
c
ij
)
(5)
At each interruption, the agent should, in theory, decide whether it is worth263
pursuing the currently executed behaviour (i.e. if there is a positive or neg-264
ative energy ratio). Usually there is insufficient knowledge available to make265
an informed decision due of the complexity or indeterminacy of the environ-266
ment. Consequently, heuristic values must be used. Nature selects for agents267
with appropriate or at least adequate thresholds; here we test a range of268
values for ψ to find which is appropriate for our particular simulations.269
2.6 Experiment and Simulation Details270
Our experiments are organised into two sets. The first set uses sim1, a very271
well defined setup that allows a great degree of control over all aspects in-272
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600FoodFood
Drink
Drink
Agent
(a) controlled environment
600
600
Agent
Resource
(b) more realistic environment
Figure 2: The two simulation environments used to test the overall efficiency
of the agents: a completely controlled scenario (a) where energy sources are
maximum distance apart, all agents are initially grouped at the centre and
interruptions are externally induced, and a more realistic scenario (b) where
agents and energy sources are placed randomly.
vestigated, particularly the frequency of interruption (see Figure 2(a)). The273
second set use sim2 (Figure 2(b)), a more realistic simulator where inter-274
ruptions are caused by the dynamics of the environment itself. For our275
experiments we consider two types of interrupts. The first type occurs when276
the source of satisfaction is depleted or otherwise removed (e.g., an agent277
looses his current grooming partner). The second type of interrupt is caused278
by higher priority drives that are triggered.279
In both simulations, there are 5 identical agents. Furthermore, sim1280
positions the energy sources such that they are maximum distance from one281
another3. In this simulation, we exactly control the number of interruptions282
an agent is exposed to throughout the execution of a single behaviour. Once283
3The simulation is toroidal and agents are able to move, for example, from the far left
to the far right in one move.
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an agent is interrupted, it is forced to consider an alternative energy source284
(it is not allowed to remain at the current one). The second simulation is285
somewhat more realistic and is used to verify the results obtained from the286
first set of experiments. In sim2, energy sources are scattered randomly287
across the world. Each energy source has a certain load that depletes as an288
agent consumes it. Once depleted, the energy source vanishes, but, at the289
same time, a new energy source appears elsewhere in the world. The load290
of any energy source has a maximum of 50 units and depletes by 2 units if291
consumed. All energy sources gain 1 unit per time step.292
The experiments are executed over 15 distinct trials. Each trial executes293
the simulation for 5000 time steps. All internal states are initialised such that294
Ei = δi, thus all behaviours are triggered immediately once the simulation295
begins. At each time step, the agent may execute a single action. The296
results are simply the number of times each primary action has been executed,297
averaged over all agents and trials. In all cases, a two-tailed t-test is used to298
test for significance with a confidence of 0.995. We chose the same threshold299
settings across all behaviours and again, we drop the subscripts from here300
on. Furthermore, we set δ = 200 in all experiments, giving an agent sufficient301
energy for 200/e− = 2000 time steps before E falls to zero after a behaviour302
has been triggered.303
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no latch latched significance
action φ = δ 10 50 100 0-10 10-50 50-100
Bα1 443 452 478 494 * * *
Bα2 443 452 479 498 * * *
Bα3 0 0 454 468 *
Bα4 0 0 1414 2037 * *
total 886 903 2824 3498
Table 1: Comparing latched and unlatched behaviours. The latches are
chosen to be φ− δ ∈ {0, 10, 50, 100}.
3 Results304
3.1 Controlled Environment: Sim1305
The first experiment compares the unlatched version with the strictly latched306
one. The results are shown in Table 1. The data confirms that in the307
unlatched case, dithering prevents the agent from pursuing any of the lower308
priority behaviours. The latch effectively solves this problem, although only309
if the latch is sufficiently large. A latch of size 10 does increase the activity of310
the primary actions for behaviours B1 and B2 but still does not allow for the311
lower-priority behaviours B3 and B4 to be executed. Once the latch increases312
sufficiently in size, so does the activity of the lower-priority behaviours. This313
result is not surprising. Note though that too large a latch might also lead to314
neglect of lower-priority behaviours, since the highest-level goals might never315
be satisfied.316
The next experiment investigates the efficiency of strict latching once317
an agent is confronted with interruptions. The data for this experiment318
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10 50 100 significance
action 1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5 0-1 0-3 0-5 1-3 3-5
Bα1 458 442 420 478 481 462 519 504 508 * * *
Bα2 454 441 429 474 481 455 521 512 519 * *
Bα3 0 0 0 277 1 0 468 421 1 * * * *
Bα4 0 0 0 95 0 0 1119 57 0 * * * * *
total 912 882 850 1324 962 917 2627 1493 1028
Table 2: The performance of the agents given φ − δ ∈ {10, 50, 100} and 1,
3 or 5 interruptions. Significance is checked for φ = 100. Cases without
interruptions (0) are taken from the results shown in table 1 (not shown in
this table).
is summarised in Table 2. Even in the case of a single interruption, the319
frequency of primary actions executed drops significantly. The right-most320
column in the table compares the performance of a latch of size 100 with 0,321
1, 3 and 5 interruptions and the differences for the lower-priority actions are322
almost always significant.323
The final experiment using sim1 determines the performance of the flexi-324
ble latch using the same settings as in the experiment before. Here, different325
values for the intermediate threshold ψ are tested. The value of ψ is denoted326
as the percentage of the latch itself. If, for example, δ = 100 and φ = 120, a327
value of 25% would indicate that ψ = 105. The results are shown in Table 3328
and a setting of ψ = δ seems most successful. However, as shown in Table 4,329
the differences are usually not significant. In the absence of significant differ-330
ence, the zero setting is still to be preferred as it also allows us to simplify the331
action-selection mechanism. We can effectively eliminate ψ altogether but332
always reconsider priorities when interrupted. Comparing the flexible latch333
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1 3 5
action 0% 25% 50% 75% 0% 25% 50% 75% 0% 25% 50% 75%
Bα1 499 491 489 501 490 491 496 496 482 487 482 495
Bα2 492 490 496 503 483 487 491 496 488 485 493 497
Bα3 481 476 479 481 475 479 469 455 474 470 462 437
Bα4 1723 1689 1528 1312 1458 1342 1059 651 1222 1150 880 495
total 3195 3146 2991 2797 2906 2799 2516 2098 2666 2592 2318 1923
Table 3: The performance of the agents with flexible latching. ψ = δ+p(φ−δ)
where p ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}, δ = 200, φ = 300 and frequency of interruptions
equal to 1, 3 and 5. Significance of results shown in table 4.
1 3 5 vs. strict
0-25 25-50 50-75 0-25 25-50 50-75 0-25 25-50 50-75 1-1 3-3 5-5
Bα1 * *
Bα2 * * *
Bα3 * *
Bα4 * * * * * * * *
Table 4: Significance results for table 3. Increasing p has the most impact on
the lowest-priority behaviour. The right-most column compares the strictly
and flexibly latched implementation for the different frequencies of interrup-
tions.
to the strict latch shows a significant improvement in at least one behaviour’s334
primary action for any number of interruptions tested (compare Table 2 with335
Table 3; significance is indicated in the right-most column of Table 4).336
Figure 3 shows graphically how the ability to detect interruptions im-337
proves the agent’s overall efficiency. The graph plots the number of time338
steps spent executing the actions of interest given different frequencies of339
interruption. Furthermore, as a reference value, the unlatched and uninter-340
rupted latched cases are also shown. It is evident that the performance of341
the strict latch degrades very quickly while the flexible latch substantially342
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Figure 3: A graphical comparison of strict and flexible latching (
∑
4
i=1B
α
i ).
The top and bottom lines are shown for reference, indicating the latched but
uninterrupted and unlatched cases. For uninterrupted latches, the strict and
flexible cases are indistinguishable.
reduces the impact of interruptions.343
3.1.1 Death Rates344
In the previous experiments, efficiency was judged by the capacity to devote345
time to all behaviours. For these experiments, the value of δ has been set346
such that agents would always survive. In nature, such a threshold would347
evolve in species like primates that invest a great deal in individual survival348
and life histories. Nevertheless, exceptionally extreme environments or other349
unusual circumstances may cause a threshold setting to become (temporarily)350
insufficient.351
In the present experiment, we set δ such that survival in an uncertain352
environment is no longer guaranteed (δ = 40). We then compare death353
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strict latch flexible latch significance
action 0 1 2 3 1 2 3 1-1 2-2 3-3
Ba1 478 423 34 34 475 387 360 * *
Ba2 477 415 37 32 475 390 360 * * *
Ba3 460 256 0 0 444 324 255 * * *
Ba4 1402 90 0 0 750 295 140 * * *
Total 2816 1185 71 66 2144 1397 1115
dead 0 601 4551 4551 0 861 1143 * * *
Table 5: A comparison of death rates for agents with lower values of δ than
are entirely sustainable in the environmental context. Tests are run with
strict or flexible latching and with from 0–3 interruptions. Note again that
without interruptions, whether the latch is flexible is irrelevant.
rates between strict and flexible latches. The latch is also set at a relatively354
low level of φ = 45. The results are shown in Table 5. The flexible latch355
shows a significantly reduced death rate in all three relevant conditions (as356
determined by the number of interruptions). Furthermore, it is interesting357
to note that now, even with the smaller latch, the flexible implementation358
performs significantly better in almost all cases when compared to the strictly359
latched version.360
Finally, it is possible to reduce the death rate even further. In another sce-361
nario we utilise the agents’ ability to deal with interruptions: Equal-priority362
behaviours are allowed to interrupt one another if they reach a critical thresh-363
old ψ. We set ψ = 20, as per the calculations described in Section 2.5 above.364
This critical threshold essentially corresponds to the minimum energy re-365
quired to satisfy a single need. The addition of the threshold changes the366
death rates from 0, 861, 1143 to 60, 417, 472. Interestingly, the death rate367
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is actually slightly higher in the first case but noticeable lower in the other368
two cases. The differences are relatively weakly significant for this N , with369
a confidence of p < 0.05 for both the two- and three-interrupt conditions.370
3.2 Random Environment: Sim2371
The previous results showed that in sim1, latching is necessary to allow372
an agent to execute lower-priority behaviours, and that it is best to abort373
a latched behaviour immediately upon interruption. We now examine these374
results in a system with a more “natural” setup using sim2, where the timing375
and frequency of interruption depends on the dynamics of the environment376
itself.377
Table 6 compares all three implementation on sim2. The overall results378
are similar to before although there are some striking differences. Now, a379
latch of size 10 is sufficient to generate at least some frequency of execution380
for behaviours B3 and B4 whether or not it is flexible and indeed the flexi-381
bility makes no significant difference at this size latch. The change is due to382
the random environment providing more opportunities, which either imple-383
mentation is able to exploit. Once the size of the latch increases, flexibility384
creates a noticeable (as well as significant) difference for behaviour B4, but385
no difference for B3. This indicates B3’s primary action is already executed386
sufficiently even without the flexibility in the latch — the flexibility in the387
environment provides sufficient opportunities for it to satiate at the threshold388
levels we’ve specified. Nevertheless, the massive increase of opportunity for389
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unlatched strict latched flexible latched significance
action 0 10 50 100 10 50 100 10-10 50-50 100-100
Bα1 451 454 470 500 454 466 468 *
Bα2 452 454 475 490 455 466 469 * *
Bα3 0 178 365 452 154 423 471
Bα4 0 71 264 689 22 704 1289 * *
total 903 1156 1574 2131 1084 2058 2697
dead 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6: Comparing the unlatched, strictly and flexibly latched implementa-
tions in sim2 using latch sizes of φ − δ ∈ {10, 50, 100} and ψ = φ. All cases
have frequent interruptions (see main text).
expressing the exploratory behaviour shows the power of flexible latching.390
4 Discussion391
We have considered three variants of a simple threshold-based action selec-392
tion mechanisms. The completely unlatched condition may seem unrealistic,393
but several well-known reactive architectures have added latching only as an394
afterthought, handled with rather inelegant exception mechanisms [35, 16].395
Others assume latching can be handled by intelligent planning [6, 39]. This,396
however, requires a high cognitive load and in general, reasoning about time397
and distant rewards is difficult even for cognitive, symbolic systems [1].398
The basic latched approach is inspired by theories of affect and action399
selection, as well as basic control theory. LeDoux [29] for example promotes400
the theory that emotions place the brain in a cognitive context appropriate401
for a particular course of action. Neuroscience tells us that interrupting such402
emotional responses is a cognitive capacity requiring frontal-lobe inhibition403
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of the emotional response [14]. Of course, the frontal-lobe inhibition system404
must itself be a fairly automatic gating mechanism. But this mechanism405
provides an opportunity for an alternative plan to become most salient [34].406
Our system for determining appropriate thresholds for the flexible latches407
is also inspired by animal mechanisms through ethology. In particular, Dun-408
bar’s time-budget theory [17, 25] suggests that animal drives have evolved409
to ensure individuals are likely to spend the appropriate amount of time in410
behaviours, where appropriate is determined by what is adaptive. Our work411
here can be seen both as support for this theory and possibly as an elabora-412
tion, to the extent that our mechanism helps connect the time budget to the413
underlying neuroscience others have proposed (e.g. [34].)414
In AI in contrast, there have been surprisingly few recent attempts to pro-415
pose general-purpose architectural features for homeostatic control. Those416
that exist tend to create detailed biomimetic representations of hormone lev-417
els [41, 27]. Gadanho [20] has a similar perspective to our work, using emo-418
tions to control the temporal expression of behaviour. However, she focuses419
on modelling specific emotions and their impact on reinforcement learning420
systems, rather than focusing directly on control mechanisms. In contrast,421
our flexible latch is simple to implement and incorporate into any standard422
module-based agent architecture. Also, she uses rising levels of emotions as423
the source of interruptions, rather than dealing with inefficiencies caused by424
interruptions generated by the external environment.425
Interestingly, several established models of consciousness are similar to426
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our new model of flexibly-latched drives. Norman and Shallice [33] describe427
consciousness as a higher-cost attentional system which is brought on line428
whenever the more basic, reliable, low-cost action-sequencing mechanism is429
unable to proceed. Our system of flexible latching also operates by recogniz-430
ing interruptions. It would be plausible in a system with modules capable431
of deliberation to have interruptions trigger these rather than the simple re-432
assesment of existing goals demonstrated above. More recently, Shanahan433
[36] proposes a model of mutually-inhibiting motives in a global workspace.434
We do not agree with Shanahan that such models can account for all of435
action selection. Tyrrell [40] provides provides an extensive critique of a436
very similar spreading-activation architecture, The Adaptive Neural Archi-437
tecture [30] (more commonly referred to as Maes’ Nets [19]), explaining why438
spreading-activation models cannot scale to a full action-selection mecha-439
nism. The problem is simple combinatorics — a problem that architectures440
like ACT-R and IDA address by focussing on just one plan subset of the full441
network [19, 2]. This focussing makes these architectures functionally simi-442
lar to script-based dynamic-planning systems, although their actual action-443
selection mechanisms are far more complex. However, as this paper makes444
clear, we do think that a system like Shanahan’s or Maes’ could well account445
for high-level goal arbitration.446
IDA is a cognitive architecture specifically designed to implement a the-447
ory of consciousness [3]. IDA is not only a model, but also a working AI448
architecture which has been used to create recommender systems for the US449
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Navy. Its newest version, LIDA provides the functionality of flexible latches450
through “timekeeper codelets” [4, p. 30] which keep a proposed action salient451
long enough for a variety of options to be debated. This system could well452
be effective, and is certainly more conducive to human-like meta cognition453
than the system proposed here. However, our flexible latches are simpler and454
probably sufficient for most autonomous AI applications.455
The problems Tyrrell identified with spreading activation models are to456
some extent addressed by [22], who recommend generating a system of attrac-457
tors in the networks. This achieves an effect similar to the latching shown458
here. However, again the mechanism and architecture presented here are459
much simpler than spreading activation, even without the attractor system460
[9].461
The difficulties in scaling spreading activation networks draw attention462
to an important limit of our work. Although we have shown substantial463
efficiency improvements, temporal costs still increase linearly with the num-464
ber of interruptions. Further, some forms of interruptions will necessarily465
increase with the number of potential behaviours — in particular those that466
are generated by the action-selection mechanism itself as higher priorities467
trigger. What this implies is that agents should have a limited number of468
high-level motivations which are contested this way.469
What we present here is a cognitively-minimal mechanism which makes470
substantial improvements to an otherwise reactive action-selection system.471
Elsewhere, we explore in more detail the earlier suggestion that due to472
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LeDoux that the psychological entities called drives and emotions may be473
seen as a chemically-based latching system, evolved to provide persistence474
and coherence to the otherwise electrically-based action selection provided475
by the central nervous system [13]. We hypothesise that in nature, each476
drive or emotion — with its associated pattern of hormonal regulators and477
species-typical actions — might be viewed as serving one such high-level goal478
or need. We recommend that a system such as our flexible latch should simi-479
larly be used for each high-level goal an agent has that requires a time budget480
in an artificial cognitive system.481
5 Conclusions482
In this paper we have presented a relatively simple way to introduce flexible483
latching into an autonomous system and presented an analysis of how to de-484
termine appropriate thresholds that govern the execution of lower-priority be-485
haviours. The agents we considered have been specified using the behaviour-486
oriented design methodology: each agent consists of a set of modules that487
specify specific behaviours as well as a dynamic plan that prioritises amongst488
these behaviours. We take this as a fairly standard modular architecture us-489
ing scripted dynamic plans for action selection, and then demonstrate how490
to extend that action selection to improve its efficiency.491
We demonstrate our system using four behaviours derived from a tool for492
modelling primate social behaviour. Two behaviours — eating and drinking493
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— are essential to the immediate survival of the agent and are of highest (and494
equal) priority. The third, grooming, represents a mission-critical behaviour495
though it is not essential for immediate survival. This and the fourth, default496
behaviour (exploring) can only be executed if the higher priority behaviours497
are managed efficiently. Each behaviour is composed of a number of indi-498
vidual actions and we distinguish between primary and secondary actions.499
Secondary actions are those required to perform the primary action; the pri-500
mary action is the core consumatory action of the behaviour and satisfies501
the agent’s need that triggers the behavioural module. Efficient execution502
of behaviours requires the agents to (a) minimise the execution of secondary503
actions, and (b) acquire sufficient satisfaction (energy in our case) to be able504
to carry out lower-priority behaviours.505
The behaviour- (or action-) selection mechanism we have introduced con-506
sists of three thresholds: A lower threshold δ that triggers the behaviour507
depending on the agent’s internal state, an intermediate threshold, ψ, that508
acts in case the agent is interrupted and an upper threshold, φ, that causes509
the behaviour to terminate. The addition of these thresholds does not al-510
ter the priorities of the behaviours (which are still governed by the dynamic511
plan) but may delay (or not) the execution of lower-priority behaviours and512
may have a significant impact on the ratio of secondary to primary actions513
performed by the agent. We demonstrated their efficacy in two experimental514
settings. Without latching (i.e., only a lower threshold), the agent dithers515
between food sources, leaving no time to execute lower-priority behaviours.516
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Latching (i.e., lower and upper threshold) allows for persistence but may be517
hugely inefficient in the presence of interruptions. The persistent pursue of518
unsatisfied behaviours may lead to an unsustainable frequency of secondary519
task executions.520
The experiments allowed us to determine the most useful setting for the521
intermediate threshold, above which an interrupted agent may reconsider its522
behaviour priorities. The results show that the utility of latching, as long523
as the latch is sufficiently large, where there is a significant cost of switch-524
ing between goals. Flexible latching addresses a reduction in performance of525
latches when there are interruptions. We found however that the interme-526
diate threshold is usually not required, or more precisely, can be set to be527
equal to the lower threshold. In our experiments, it was optimal for agents528
to reconsider priorities whenever interrupted. This result may not hold if529
interuptions are more frequent and/or the size of the latch is smaller, since530
either case would increase the probability that persistance is needed. Finally,531
we also explored the case where the agent may die if essential behaviours are532
carried out inefficiently. We found that latching significantly improves the533
rate of survival of the agent.534
We have discussed how this mechanism, despite its simplicity, or because535
of it, may be relevant to numerous existing artificial cognitive architectures,536
and we have drawn parallels to animal-like decision making processes. Al-537
though the validation presented here is admittedly limited, these results do538
match expectations derived from our observations in nature concerning the539
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life-history strategies for species that tend to be correlated with more cog-540
nitive ability. At the same time, the work presented here also allows for541
extremely simple implementations such as hand-coding heuristic indicators542
of interruption.543
There are numerous possible avenues to be explored in the near future.544
In our experiments, we chose the same thresholds for all behaviours, allowing545
a centralised approach that involves little overhead. However, it would be546
interesting to highlight potential differences in the efficiency of an agent’s547
action selection when all behaviours have individual threshold settings. Fur-548
thermore, the thresholds may be adjusted dynamically over time (e.g., using549
a simple feedback control loop) or in artificial life contexts might be individ-550
ually evolved.551
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